Abstract. In this paper, we present the generation of a common reference string "from scratch" via coin-flipping in the presence of a quantum adversary. First, we present how we achieve quantumsecure coin-flipping using Watrous' quantum rewinding technique [Wat06] . Then, by combining this coin-flipping with any non-interactive zero-knowledge protocol we get an easy transformation from non-interactive zero-knowledge in general to interactive quantum zero-knowledge. Finally, we sketch how we can integrate quantum-secure coin-flipping into the currently proposed quantum protocols with hybrid security [DF + 09].
Preliminaries
We assume the reader's familiarity with basic notation and concepts of quantum information processing as in standard literature e.g. [NC00] . Furthermore, most details on the discussed applications are omitted here but can be found in the referred papers.
We denote by negl (n) any function of n smaller than the inverse of any polynomial, provided n is sufficiently large. We often leave the dependence on n implicit and simply write negl. A quantum algorithm consists of a family {C n } n∈N of quantum circuits and is said to run in polynomial time, if the number of gates of C n is polynomial in n. Indistinguishability between x, y is in general denoted by relation x ≈ y. Two families of quantum states {ρ n } n∈N and {σ n } n∈N are called quantum-computationally indistinguishable, denoted ρ q ≈ σ, if any polynomial-time quantum algorithm has negligible advantage (in n) of distinguishing ρ n from σ n .
For the definition of computational security against dishonest Bob, we assume two different worlds: The real world that models the actual protocol and the ideal world based on an ideal functionality F that describes the intended behavior of the protocol. Intuitively, if both execution are indistinguishable, security of the protocol in real life follows. In the common reference string (CRS) model, all participants in the real life protocol have access to a classical public CRS, which is chosen before any interaction starts, according to a distribution only depending on the security parameter. On the other hand, the participants in the ideal world interacting only with the ideal functionality do not make use of the CRS. Hence, an ideal world adversarŷ B * that operates by simulating a real world adversary B * is free to choose a string in any way he wishes.
Quantum-Secure Coin-Flipping
Secure coin-flipping allows two parties to agree on a uniformly random bit in a fair way, i.e., neither party can influence the value of the coin to his advantage. We use a standard coinflipping protocol where Alice (A) commits to a bit a, Bob (B) sends b, A opens the commitment and the resulting coin is a⊕b. We assume the commitment scheme to be unconditionally binding and computationally hiding against a quantum adversary. Such a scheme follows, for instance, from any pseudorandom generator secure against quantum distinguishers D. Using Watrous' quantum rewinding method [Wat06] , we show that this protocol securely implements a natural coin-flipping functionality that outputs a random bit to both parties, but the output can be blocked by the adversary. Clearly, one can generate a random common reference string by calling such a functionality sequentially a sufficient number of times. The honest party will abort, if the process stops prematurely. Quantum-secure coin-flipping can then be combined with other cryptographic tasks such as a non-interactive zero-knowledge protocol to obtain interactive quantum zero-knowledge or the quantum protocols of [DF + 09], implementing e.g. passwordbased identification and oblivious transfer, with security, i.e. security against dishonest Bob, if either he is computationally bounded or if his quantum storage is of limited size.
Bit Commitment
Naor showed in [Nao91] how a pseudorandom generator can provide unconditionally binding bit commitment without sharing any initial information. A pseudorandom generator is a function that maps a short, randomly chosen seed to a long pseudorandom sequence, which is computationally indistinguishable from a truly random string for any polynomial-time bounded quantum adversary. Informally speaking, pseudorandomness ensures unpredictability of the next bit in the sequence after learning the previous one. More formally [Nao91] , let G :
A bit commitment scheme using pseudorandomness is now constructed as follows. Let a be the bit to which Alice wants to commit, and let G i (s) denote the ith bit of the pseudorandom sequence on seed s. To ensure the binding property, Bob sends a random vector R B = (r 1 , . . . , r 3n ) where r i ∈ R {0, 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3n. Alice selects s ∈ R {0, 1} n and sends the vector R A = (r ′ 1 , . . . , r ′ 3n ), where
To open the commitment, Alice sends s and Bob then verifies that for all i, r ′ i = G i (s) for r i = 0 and r ′ i = G i (s) ⊕ a for r i = 1. Assuming that dishonest Bob B * is polynomial-time bounded, he cannot learn anything about a. Otherwise, he could be used to construct a distinguisher D between pseudorandom and truly random outputs. It follows that any (quantum-)computationally bounded B * can only guess a with probability essentially 1/2, so the commitment scheme is quantum-computationally hiding. Furthermore, for any (unbounded) dishonest Alice A * , opening a commitment to both values 0 and 1 requires a seed pair (s 1 , s 2 ), such that sequences G 3n (s 1 ) and G 3n (s 2 ) agree for all i where r i = 0 and disagree for all i where r i = 1, i.e. r i = G i (s 1 ) ⊕ G i (s 2 ) for exactly one R B chosen by B. The probability for the existence of such a pair is at most 2 2n /2 3n = 2 −n . It follows that A * can reveal only one possible a, except with probability less than 2 −n , which satisfies statistical binding.
The Protocol
We let Alice and Bob run the following Coin − Flip Protocol, which interactively generates a random and fair coin in one execution. We use an unconditionally binding and quantumcomputationally hiding commitment scheme which takes a bit and some randomness r of length l as input, i.e. com : {0, 1} × {0, 1} l → {0, 1} l+1 . We describe the commitment scheme in simple notation, however, if it is based on Naor's pseudorandom generator, the precise notation has to be slightly adapted. The protocol is shown in Figure 1 .
Correctness is obvious by inspection of the protocol. If both players are honest, they independently choose random bits. These bits are then combined via XOR, resulting in a uniformly random coin. The ideal coin-flip functionality F COIN is described in Figure 2 . Note that dishonest A * may also refuse to open com(a, r) after learning B's input in the real world. In this case, F COIN allows her a second input REFUSE, leading to output FAIL and modeling the abort of the real protocol.
Ideal Functionality F COIN : Upon receiving requests START from Alice and Bob, F COIN outputs a uniformly random coin to Alice. It then waits to receive Alice's second input OK or REFUSE and outputs coin or FAIL to Bob, respectively. 
Security Proof Sketch
Proof Sketch for Unconditional Security against A * : We construct a classical ideal-world adversaryÂ * , such that the real output of the protocol is indistinguishable from the ideal output produced byÂ * , F COIN and A * .
Ideal World SimulationÂ * :
1. Upon receiving com(a, r) from A * ,Â * sends START and then OK to F COIN as first and second input, respectively, and receives a uniformly random coin.
2.Â
* computes a and r from com(a, r).
3.Â
* computes b = coin ⊕ a and sends b to A * . 4.Â * waits to receive A * 's last message and outputs whatever A * outputs. First note that a, r and com(a, r) are chosen and computed as in the real protocol. From the unconditional binding property of the commitment scheme, it follows that A * 's choice bit a is uniquely determined from com(a, r), since for any com, there exists at most one pair (a, r) such that com = com(a, r). Hence in the real world, A * is unconditionally bound to her bit before she learns B's choice bit, which means a is independent of b. Therefore in Step 2, the simulator can correctly (but not necessarily efficiently) compute a (and r). Note that, in the case of unconditional security, we do not require the simulation to be efficient. Due to the properties of XOR, A * cannot tell the difference between the random b computed in the simulation (from the ideal, random coin) in Step 3 and the randomly chosen b of the real world. It follows that the ideal output is indistinguishable from the output in the real world.
Proof Sketch for (Quantum-) Computational Security against B * : To prove security against any dishonest (quantum-) computationally bounded B * , we show that there exists an ideal-world simulation with output indistinguishable from the output of the protocol in the real world. In , r) , b, open(a, r)) and coin. Otherwise, it rewinds B * and repeats the simulation. Note that our security proof should hold also against any quantum adversary. The polynomial-time quantum simulator proceeds similarly to its classical analogue but requires quantum registers as work space and relies on the quantum rewinding method introduced by Watrous in [Wat06] .
In his paper, Watrous proves how to construct a quantum zero-knowledge proof system for graph isomorphism using his (ideal) quantum rewinding lemma. The protocol proceeds as a Σ-protocol, i.e. a protocol in three-move form, where the verifier flips a single coin in the second step and sends this challenge to the prover. Since these are the essential aspects also in our Coin − Flip Protocol, we can simply apply Watrous' quantum rewinding technique (with slight modifications) as a black-box to our protocol, and we also closely follow his notation and line of argument. For a detailed description and proofs, we refer to [Wat06] .
Let W denote B * 's auxiliary input, containing an n-qubit state |ψ . Furthermore, let V and B denote B * 's work space, where V is an arbitrary polynomial-size register and B is a single qubit register. A's classical messages are considered in the following as being stored in quantum registers A 1 and A 2 . In addition, the quantum simulator uses registers R, containing all possible choices of a classical simulator, and G, representing its guess on B * 's message in the second step. Finally, let X denote a working register of size k, which is initialized to the state |0 k and corresponds to the collection of all registers as described above except W .
The quantum rewinding procedure is implemented by a general quantum circuit R coin with input ((W, X), B * , coin). As a first step, it applies a unitary (n, k)-quantum circuit Q to (W, X) to simulate the conversation, obtaining registers (G, Y ). Then, a test takes place to observe whether the simulation was successful. In that case, R coin outputs the resulting quantum register. Otherwise, it quantumly rewinds by applying the reverse circuit Q † on (G, Y ) to retrieve (W, X) and then a phase-flip transformation on X before another iteration of Q is applied. Note that R coin is essentially the same circuit as R described in [Wat06] , but in our application it depends on the value of a given coin, i.e., we apply R 0 or R 1 for coin = 0 or coin = 1, respectively.
In more detail, Q(W, X, B * , coin) transforms (W, X) to (G, Y ) by the following unitary operations:
(1) It first constructs the superposition
wherek ≤ k. Note that the state of registers (A 1 , G, A 2 ) corresponds to a uniform distribution of possible transcripts of the interaction between the players.
(2) For each possible com(a, r), it then simulates B * 's possible actions by applying a unitary operator to (W, V, B, A 1 ) with A 1 as control:
whereφ andψ describe modified quantum states. (3) Finally, a CNOT-operation is applied to pair (B, G) with B as control to check whether the simulator's guess of B * 's choice was correct. The result of the CNOT-operation is stored in register G, and we denote with Y the register that contains the residual n + k − 1-qubit
After applying Q the system can be written as
where |φ good (ψ) denotes the state, we want the system to be in for a successful simulation. R coin then measures the qubit in register G with respect to the standard basis, which indicates success or failure of the simulation. A successful execution (where b = b ′ ) results in outcome 0 with probability p ∈ (0, 1). In that case, R coin outputs Y . A measurement outcome 1 indicates b = b ′ , in which case R coin quantumly rewinds the system and repeats the simulation by applying
Watrous' quantum rewinding lemma (without perturbations) then states the following. Under the condition that the probability p of a successful simulation is non-negligible and independent of any auxiliary input, the output ρ(ψ) of R has square-fidelity close to 1 with state |φ good (ψ) of a successful simulation, i.e.,
where the square-fidelity can be seen as a measure of closeness and ε ∈ (0, 1) denotes the error bound. Note that for the special case where p equals 1/2 and is independent of |ψ , the simulation terminates after at most one rewinding. However, we cannot apply the exact version of Watrous' rewinding lemma to our protocol, since the commitment scheme is only computationally hiding. Instead, we must allow for small perturbations in the quantum rewinding procedure as follows. Let adv denote B * 's advantage over a random guess on the committed value due to his computing power, i.e. adv = |p − 1/2|. From the computational hiding property, it follows that adv ∈ negl. Thus, we can argue that the success probability p is close to independent of the auxiliary input and Watrous quantum rewinding lemma with small perturbations, as stated below (Lemma 2.1), applies with q = 1 2 and ε = adv.
Lemma 2.1 (Quantum Rewinding Lemma with small perturbations [Wat06] ). Let Q be the unitary (n,k)-quantum circuit as given in [Wat06] . Furthermore, let p 0 , q ∈ (0, 1) and ε ∈ (0, 1 2 ) be real numbers such that 
such that, for every n-qubit state |ψ , the output ρ(ψ) of R satisfies
Note that p 0 denotes the lower bound on the success probability, for which the procedure guarantees correctness. All operations in Q can be performed by polynomial-size circuits, and thus, the simulator has polynomial size (in the worst case). Furthermore, for ε ∈ negl but p 0 (1 − p 0 ) ∈ negl, it follows that ε ′ ∈ negl. Hence, the square-fidelity of output ρ(ψ) with good state |φ good (ψ) is slightly reduced but still close to 1 and quantum rewinding remains possible. Now, to proof security against quantum B * , we first specify an algorithm QRewind (see Figure 4) . Then, we construct an ideal world quantum simulatorB * * (see Figure 5) , interacting with B * and the ideal functionality F COIN and executing QRewind. We then compare the output state of the real process and the output state of the ideal process. In case of indistinguishable outputs, quantum-computational security against B * follows.
QRewind(W, X, B * , coin):
1. Get classical coin, quantum registers W and X, and B * as input. 2. Depending on the value of coin, apply the corresponding circuit Rcoin with input W, X, B * and coin. 3. Output Y . , r), b, open(a, r) ). It outputs whatever B * outputs. To show that the output of the ideal-world simulation is indistinguishable from the real output, first note that the superposition constructed as described above as step (1) in Q corresponds to all possible random choices of values in the real protocol. Furthermore, the circuit models any possible strategy of quantum B * in (2), depending on control register |com(a, r) A 1 . The CNOT-operation on (B, G) in (3), followed by a standard measurement of G indicates whether the guess b ′ on B * 's choice b was correct. If that was not the case (i.e. b = b ′ and measurement result 1), the system gets quantumly rewound by applying reverse transformations (3)-(1), followed by a phase-flip operation. The procedure is repeated until the measurement outcome is 0 and hence b = b ′ . Watrous' lemma then guarantees that, assuming ε = adv ∈ negl but p 0 (1 − p 0 ) ∈ negl, then ε ′ ∈ negl and thus, the final output ρ(ψ) of the simulation is close to good state |φ good (ψ) . It follows that the output of the ideal simulation is indistinguishable from the output in the real world.
Ideal World SimulationB

Applications
Interactive Quantum Zero-Knowledge
The notion of (interactive) zero-knowledge (ZK) was introduced by Goldwasser et al. [GMR89] . Informally, ZK proofs for any NP language L yield no other knowledge to the verifier than the validity of the assertion proved, i.e. x ∈ L. Thus, only this one bit of knowledge is communicated from the prover to the verifier and zero additional knowledge. For an overview, see e.g. [Gol01, Gol04] .
Blum et al. [BFM88] then showed that the interaction between prover and verifier in any ZK proof can be replaced by sharing a short, random common reference string according to some distribution and available to all parties from the start of the protocol. Note that a CRS is a weaker requirement than interaction. Since all information is communicated mono-directional from the prover to the verifier, we do not have to require any restriction on the verifier.
As in the classical case, where ZK protocols exist if one-way functions exist, quantum zero-knowledge (QZK) is possible under the assumption that quantum one-way functions exist. In [Kob03] , Kobayashi showed that a common reference string or shared entanglement is necessary for non-interactive quantum perfect resp. statistical zero-knowledge (NIQPZK resp. NIQSZK). Finally, the first Σ-protocols for QZK in the CRS-model withstanding even active quantum attacks were constructed by Damgård et al. [DFS04] .
Recently, Hallgren et al. [HKSZ08] showed how to transform a Σ-protocol with stage-bystage honest verifier zero-knowledge into a new Σ-protocol that is zero-knowledge against all classical and quantum verifiers. They propose special bit commitment schemes to limit the number of rounds, and then view each round as a stage for which an honest verifier simulator is assumed. Then by using the technique of [DGW94] , each stage can be converted to obtain zero-knowledge against all classical verifiers. Finally, Watrous' quantum rewinding lemma can be applied in each stage to prove zero-knowledge also against any quantum verifier.
Here, we propose an easy transformation from non-interactive zero-knowledge in general (NIZK) to interactive quantum zero-knowledge (IQZK) by combining the Coin − Flip Protocol with any NIZK-protocol. Our coin-flipping generates a truly random coin even in the case of a malicious quantum verifier. A sequence of such coins can then be used in any subsequent non-interactive zero-knowledge protocol, which is also secure against quantum verifiers due to its mono-direction. In the following, we define a (NIZK)-subprotocol as in [BFM88] : Both parties A and B get common input x. For any constants c and d, a common reference string ω of size k allows the prover A, who knows a witness w, to give a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof π of any k c theorems of size k d to a computationally bounded verifier B. The (NIZK)-subprotocol satisfies completeness, soundness and zero-knowledgeness.
The resulting IQZK Protocol is shown in Figure 6 . In the following, we sketch that the IQZK Protocol is indeed an interactive quantum zero-knowledge protocol.
Completeness: If x ∈ L, the probability that (A, B) rejects x is negligible in the length of x.
It follows from the analysis of the Coin − Flip Protocol that if both players honestly choose random bits, each coin i in the (CFP)-subprotocol is generated uniformly at random. Hence, ω is a uniformly random common reference string of size k. By definition of any (NIZK)-subprotocol, we have acceptance probability
where ε ∈ negl. Thus, completeness for the IQZK Protocol follows.
Soundness: If x / ∈ L, then for any unbounded prover A * , the probability that (A * , B) accepts x is negligible in the length of x. Any dishonest A * might stop the IQZK Protocol at any point during execution. For example, she can refuse to open a commitment or send an invalid opening in any iteration of the (CFP)-subprotocol or she can refuse to send a proof π in the (NIZK)-subprotocol. Furthermore, A * can use an invalid ω (or x) for π. In all of these cases, B will abort without even checking the proof. Therefore, A * 's best strategy is to "play the entire game", i.e. to execute the entire IQZK Protocol without making obvious cheats. A * can try to convince B in the (NIZK)-subprotocol of a π for any given (i.e. normally generated) ω with probability
IQZK Protocol:
Therefore, the probability that A * can convince B in the IQZK Protocol in case of x / ∈ L is negligible and its soundness follows.
Zero-Knowledgeness: An interactive proof system (A, B * ) for language L is quantum zeroknowledge, if for a quantum verifier B * , there exists a simulatorŜ IQZK , such that we havê S IQZK ≈ (A, B * ) on input x ∈ L and arbitrary additional (quantum) input W .
We construct simulatorŜ IQZK , interacting with dishonest B * and simulatorsŜ CFP andŜ NIZK . S IQZK is described in Figure 8 . We then show that the output of this simulation is indistinguishable from the output of the real protocol for any B * .
S CFP in Figure 7 is similar toB * * as specified for the Coin − Flip Protocol in Figure 5 , except that it does not invoke the ideal functionality F COIN but works with any coin that it gets as input. Furthermore, under the assumption on the zero-knowledgeness of any NIZK Protocol, there exists a simulatorŜ NIZK that, on input x ∈ L, generates a randomly looking common reference string ω together with a valid proof π for x (without knowing the witness w). 
In
Step 2,Ŝ NIZK generates a correct π(ω, x) and a randomly looking ω. It then outputs π(ω, x) and ω toŜ IQZK . The "merging" of the coins into ω in Step 5 of the real protocol is equivalent to
1.Ŝ IQZK gets classical input x and quantum input W and X. 2. It invokesŜ NIZK with x and receives π(ω, x). 3. Let ω = coin1 . . . coin k . For each i = 1, . . . , k,Ŝ IQZK startsŜ CFP using the respective coini. 4.Ŝ IQZK outputs π(ω, x). the "splitting" of ω into coins in Step 3 of the simulation. As shown earlier, each iteration ofŜ CFP correctly simulates an iteration of the (CFP)-subprotocol. Note that, in contrast to the simulation in Figure 5 , the fact that coin looks random to B * is not guaranteed by F COIN but byŜ NIZK . Thus, the output of the simulation π(ω, x) as well as transcripts (com(a i , r i ), b i , open(a i , r i ) ) and ω = coin 1 , . . . , coin k ∀i = 1, . . . , k are indistinguishable from the real output. Zero-knowledge for the IQZK Protocol follows.
Generating Commitment Keys for Quantum Protocols with Improved Security
Recently, [DF + 09] proposed a new technique for improving the security of quantum protocols of a certain type, i.e. BB84-type protocols, where A transmits random BB84-qubits and Bob measures them in random bases. The technique also preserves security in the bounded-quantumstorage model (BQSM), that assumes Bob's quantum storage to be of limited size. So if the original protocol was BQSM-secure, the improved protocol is hybrid-secure and can only be broken by an adversary who has large quantum memory and large computing power. The example applications implement functionalities such as password-based identification in protocol DualQID and oblivious transfer in protocol 1 − 2 DualQOT ℓ but the technique is very general and can be applied to any BB84-type quantum protocol. The CRS-model is assumed to achieve high efficiency and practicability. Briefly, the argument for computational security proceeds along the following lines. The (keyed) dual-mode commitment scheme that is used in the verification phase must have the special properties that the key can be generated by one of two possible key-generation algorithms: G H or G B . Depending of the key in use, the scheme then provides both flavors of security. Namely, with key pkH generated by G H , respectively pkB produced by G B , the commitment scheme is unconditionally hiding or unconditionally binding. Furthermore, the scheme must be secure against a quantum adversary and it should hold that pkH q ≈ pkB. In the real life protocol, B uses the unconditionally hiding key pkH to maintain unconditional security against any unbounded A * . To argue security against a computationally bounded B * , an information-theoretic argument involving simulator B * is given to prove that B * cannot cheat with the unconditionally binding key pkB. Security in real life then follows from the indistinguishability of pkH and pkB.
Here, we discuss integrating the generation of a common reference string from scratch based on quantum-secure coin-flipping. Thus, we can implement the entire process of such applications with hybrid security in the quantum world under realistic assumptions, starting with the generation of a CRS without any initially shared information and using it later as commitment key in the verification phase. However, implementing the entire process comes at the cost of a non constant-round construction, added to otherwise very efficient protocols under the CRS-assumption.
As mentioned in [DF + 09], a dual-mode commitment scheme can be constructed from the cryptosystem of Regev [Reg05] . Briefly, the cryptosystem uses dimension k as security parameter and is parametrized by two integers m and p, where p is a prime, and a probability distribution on Z p . Even though Regev does not explicitly state that his scheme has the special property of indistinguishable keys, it is implicit in his proof that this assumption implies semantic security. A regular public key for his system is indistinguishable from a case where the public key is chosen independently from the secret key, and in this case, the ciphertext carries essentially no information about the message. Thus, for a commitment scheme, the public key pk of a regular key pair (pk, sk) can be used as the unconditional binding key pkB ′ for the ideal world simulation. Then for the real protocol, an unconditionally hiding key pkH ′ can simply be constructed by uniformly choosing numbers in Z k p × Z p . Both public keys will be of size O(mk log p), and the encryption process involves only modular additions, which makes its use simple and efficient.
The idea is now the following. We add (at least) k executions of our Coin − Flip Protocol as a first step to the hybrid-secure protocols to construct a uniformly random sequence coin 1 . . . coin k . These k random bits produce a pkH ′ as sampled by G H , except with small probability. Hence, in the real world, Bob can then use coin 1 . . . coin k = pkH ′ for committing to all his basis choices and measurement outcomes. Since an ideal-world adversaryB * is free to choose any key, it can generate (pkB ′ , sk ′ ), i.e. a regular public key together with a secret key according to Regev's cryptosystem. For the security proof, write pkB ′ = coin 1 . . . coin k . In the simulation,B * first executes QRewind with input coin i for all i = 1, . . . , k. Then,B * has the possibility to decrypt dishonest B * 's commitments during the simulation of DualQID and 1 − 2 DualQOT ℓ , which binds B * unconditionally to his committed measurement bases and outcomes. Finally, as we proved in the analysis of the Coin − Flip Protocol that pkH ′ is a uniformly random string, Regev's proof of semantic security shows that pkH ′ q ≈ pkB ′ , and (quantum-) computational security of the real world protocols follows.
